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A B S T R A C T   
Innovation in digital technologies is central to contemporary debates about the need for policy and regulatory 
adjustment in response to the consequences of the centrality of these technologies in contemporary societies. 
Christopher Freeman’s research in relation to changes in techno-economic paradigm and, specifically, in relation 
to the information and communication technology (ICT) paradigm, cautioned that assessments of these changes 
needed to go beyond market dynamics to examine social, cultural and political issues. In this paper several 
predominant themes in his work are foregrounded – the ambiguity of changes within the ICT paradigm; the role 
of guiding principles in influencing expectations about societal outcomes; and the importance of political factors 
in shaping the consequences of technological innovation. These three themes are then deployed in a discussion of 
recent innovations – two technical (5G mobile networks and artificial intelligence-as-a-service) and one insti-
tutional (proposals for changes in the international taxation regime in response to claims that the existing regime 
is inappropriate in the face of global online service provision). In each instance, the aim is to illustrate how 
following Freeman by giving attention to the themes operates as an important guide to analysis of adjustments to 
novel deployments of digital technology. The conclusion emphasizes the value of Freeman’s contributions to 
shaping research agendas that acknowledge the need to humanize technology, to consider alternatives to taken- 
for-granted principles and practices, and to take into account the role of political power in tandem with 
concentrated economic power.   
Introduction 
In the third decade of the 21st Century digitalization and online 
connectivity (when accessible and affordable) support services yielding 
enormous quantities of data. Companies are appropriating these data for 
monetization purposes. Governments are seeking access to them in 
support of public services. And artificial intelligence (AI), machine 
learning techniques and data analytics are permeating decision making. 
Commercial datafication practices are being employed by a small 
number of dominant digital platform companies originating in the 
United States or China. Accompanying these developments is debate 
about the societal benefits, the harmful consequences and the appro-
priate policy responses. 
One view of these developments is that if adjustment to these 
changes is sufficiently rapid, destabilizations in the economy and harms 
to the polity will be mitigated as the economy returns to equilibrium 
following the shock of rapid digital technology innovation. This, it is 
argued, will ensure that benefits for all are maximized to yield valued 
societal outcomes. A different view is that the application of these 
technologies for commercial purposes is producing multiple social and 
political harms. These include the proliferation of mis- or dis- 
information, hate speech and an overreliance on algorithm-derived 
biased information as a result of behavioral surveillance 
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; Van Dijck et al., 2018). In this 
view, the harms of ubiquitous digital services cannot be mitigated 
without policy intervention. This is because the outcomes of datafication 
as practiced especially by the largest digital platforms are deemed to 
jeopardize public values including rights to privacy protection, 
non-discrimination and equitable treatment of citizens and consumers. 
The study of how innovation has produced the microelectronics- 
based information and communication technology (ICT) paradigm is 
at the heart of Christopher Freeman’s work (Freeman, 2007). At the time 
he was writing, these developments were captured under the label in-
formation society revolution. They are more likely now to be charac-
terized as the 4th Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2017) or, critically, as 
‘data colonialism’ (Couldry & Mejias, 2019). In this view, the principal 
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ambition of continuous innovation within the ICT paradigm – and now 
an AI-inspired paradigm – is a logic of accumulation based on the 
extraction of economic value from data with returns accruing dispro-
portionately to the owners of digital systems located in the global North. 
The outcome of this market dynamic is seen as presenting multiple 
challenges for the future of human autonomy and welfare in the wake of 
computerized operations generating ‘behavioral surplus’ for the benefit 
of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2019). Notwithstanding criticism of 
the business models of the ‘big tech’ and many other companies that 
apply digital technologies and services and policy debates about how 
datafication activities should be regulated, citizens and consumers are 
persistently exhorted to adjust to the shocks of technological change in 
the digital infrastructure (the internet, fixed and mobile communica-
tion) and in service applications (social media, electronic commerce, 
search engines and data analytics) (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2020). 
In much of his work in the systems of innovation tradition (Borrás & 
Edquist, 2019), Freeman focused on the R&D system, on firm-level 
innovation and on policy designed to influence firm-level innovation. 
However, especially in his work on the determinants of the ICT para-
digm, he frequently encouraged research intended to answer questions 
about why and how new technologies, institutions and practices come 
into being with the aim of investigating their broader consequences for 
society (Freeman, 1994). He insisted, with Carlota Perez, that the soci-
etal adjustments needed to benefit from or mitigate harms accompa-
nying the ICT paradigm are hard to achieve (Freeman & Perez, 1988) 
and that they emerge from ‘experiments, enthusiasms, theories, beliefs 
and interests’ of multiple actors (Freeman, 1994, p. 11). He was clear 
that benefits and harms linked to the ICT paradigm cannot be assessed 
adequately when analysis is restricted to technology-driven shocks to 
the economic system, and he often commented upon the importance of 
cultural, social and political factors. 
Of numerous prominent themes in Freeman’s work signaling the 
complexity of ICT paradigm-related adjustment, three are selected for 
consideration in section 2 to highlight the attention he gave to de-
terminants of change beyond the economic analysis of market dynamics. 
A first theme is the attention Freeman gave to the ambiguity of tech-
nological innovation outcomes. A second theme is the need to under-
stand the principles that become embodied in institutionalized norms 
and how these condition expectations in relation to the design and use of 
ICTs. The third theme is the importance of politics in the innovation 
process and, particularly, the interpenetration of political and economic 
power. These themes are used as a guide in section 3 for an examination 
of contemporary developments in the ICT paradigm (5G mobile net-
works, artificial intelligence-as-a-service (AIaaS) and taxation policy). 
These are selected not only because of their topicality at the time of 
writing, but because each is the focus of contentious debates in areas 
that go beyond innovation policy. The first two exemplify novel digital 
systems that are accompanied by high expectations of benefit and of 
harm. The third, taxation, is an area of policy that is being destabilized 
by the ICT paradigm. Each is an instance where analysis emphasizing 
these themes helps to clarify that there is always a potential for alter-
native choices to be taken about the technology innovation pathway. 
This is especially so when it is recognized that such choices are informed 
by values in addition to economic valuations (Freeman & Louça, 2001). 
2. Ambiguity, principles and the political as paradigm 
adjustment themes 
Adjustments to changes in any techno-economic paradigm are un-
derstood to be uncertain and to give rise to ambiguous outcomes in 
Freeman’s work. Outcomes are treated as a result of multiple inter-
connected causes, be they cultural, economic, political, scientific or 
technological (Freeman & Louça, 2001). In the face of a multiplicity of 
causes, the analysis of paradigm adjustment for Freeman required a shift 
‘from market economics to political and social economy’ (Freeman & 
Soete, 1997, p. 411). This shift then encouraged him to emphasize the 
importance of changes in regulatory regimes, ideas and customs; that is, 
the rules1 that condition technological and societal transformation. An 
analytical move beyond economic analysis of market dynamics towards 
additional facets of techno-economic and socio-technical transformation 
necessarily adds to the complexity of research. For Freeman, it meant 
acknowledging that the outcomes of ICT-inspired change may be posi-
tive or negative for different groups. 
If ambiguity is unavoidable in the face of complexity, then analysis 
must depart from relatively constrained theoretical models that assume 
linearity between cause and effect. Ambiguity, the first theme high-
lighted here in Freeman’s assessments of the ICT paradigm is illustrated, 
on the one hand, by optimism when he argued, for example, that ideas, 
ideals and foresight alongside technologies might help to avert ‘gloom 
and doom’ scenarios as suggested by models of human survival and 
human freedoms in the face of population growth (Freeman, 1974, p. 
451; Heilbroner, 1974). He would be similarly optimistic decades later 
about the benefits of technological innovation: ‘the economics of tech-
nical change still demonstrate the possibility of a bright future for 
human beings’ (Freeman, 1992b, p. xii). On the other hand, Freeman’s 
assessments of technological change were tinged by pessimism. In the 
early 1970s, for instance, he argued for ‘social techniques’ of policy 
making because ‘the bias in the world research-innovation system is so 
great as to constitute a danger to the future of human society’ (Freeman 
et al., 1971, p. 382). 
He read J D Bernal’s (1929/1970) utopian imaginaries of a future in 
which compound synthetic brains might be interconnected to guide 
choices that would overcome poverty with interest (Freeman, 1992a). 
When it came to assessing innovations in computational power, how-
ever, he signaled that these might be dangerous if they were to 
encourage a substitution of ‘mathematics for knowledge and computa-
tion for understanding’ (Freeman, 1973, p. 12-13). He identified prob-
lems if computer power and networks for monitoring behavior were to 
be used ‘in the style of “1984”’ to control populations (Freeman & Soete, 
1987; 2005, p. 351). He also noted that invasive ICT systems could result 
in ‘reductions in social solidarity’ (Freeman & Soete, 2005, p. 351). 
Thus, despite his hope that adjustments accompanying the ICTs para-
digm might result in a better world, Freeman’s work displays a 
commitment to upholding fundamental human rights and social soli-
darity in the face of technological innovation. With his colleagues, he 
emphasized that neither technology nor innovation policies alone would 
solve social, political and economic problems (Freeman et al., 1982, p. 
200). 
A second theme prominent in Freeman’s work is his attention to 
‘guiding principles’ or ‘commonsense practices’ associated with techno- 
economic paradigms (Freeman, 1992b). Emerging prevailing principles 
and practices were treated not simply as ‘an adjustment to trans-
formations brought about by causes outside that system. Societies have, 
in other words, a say in the shape technology is likely to take’ (Freeman 
& Soete, 1997, p. 429). He insisted that technical innovation ‘first takes 
place in the minds of imaginative people’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 211) and 
he emphasized the importance of examining mental models and biases 
arising from experiences that shape decisions about the design and 
deployment of new technologies (Freeman, 1973). Here his treatment of 
systems of innovation was informed by those who worked alongside him 
with training in sociology, psychology and political economy. Their 
work emphasized social and political determinants of changes in 
socio-technical paradigms and how ideas, values and norms come to 
infuse imaginaries or expectations in society. Freeman understood that 
some of these become dominant, shaping the moral order and what is 
1 Freeman rarely used the term ‘rules’. This terminology is present in 
contemporary studies of socio-technical transitions (Schot & Kanger, 2018; 
Schot & Steinmueller, 2018) and it frequently appears in institutional economic 
traditions applied to examine digital technology innovation processes (Mansell 
& Steinmueller, 2020). 
R. Mansell                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104296
3
regarded as beneficial or harmful.2 
Freeman commented that ‘neither economists, nor sociologists, nor 
political scientists have satisfactory theories of social change’, and he 
called upon academics to abandon their ‘jealously guarded kingdoms’ 
(Freeman, 1973, p. 6). In this way, interdisciplinary engagement might 
encourage a better understanding of prevailing mental models and 
principles and how they are implicated in harms such as social exclusion 
and the emergence of a ‘large underclass’ (Freeman & Soete, 1997). He 
emphasized that new ideas – guiding principles and practices – need to 
be tested against evidence through recourse to ‘fact, experiment, expe-
rience and logical argument’, not simply assumed to be beneficial for 
society (Freeman, 1992a, p. 29). In this context, he called for ‘pluralistic 
political and social arrangements which deliberately tolerate organized 
criticism and opposition and the expression of alternative approaches’ 
(Freeman, 1992a, p. 29). Otherwise, he suggested, alternative pathways 
for technological innovation would be unlikely to be discovered or taken 
up because of the dominance of prevailing guiding principles. 
In his assessments of technological change and, specifically, the ICT 
paradigm, a third prominent theme in Freeman’s work is the salience of 
political power and values. As he put it, it is ‘essential to look at the 
political bias and the values implicitly or explicitly present in any study 
of social systems’ (Freeman, 1973, p. 12-13). He expected the outcomes 
of techno-economic change to vary in relation to the politics of ‘regimes 
of regulation’ (Freeman, 1989) and with the ‘uneven and varied 
response of governments, firms and industries’ (Freeman & Perez, 1988, 
p. 64), and, of course, also consumers and citizens. He also noted the 
inertia of institutions in response to harms or threats and ‘the political 
power of established interest groups’ (Freeman & Soete, 1987, p. 58). 
For example, in contrast to those who imagined a potential for a hori-
zontalization of power relations in the wake of digital networks and 
their applications, he observed that these developments did not ‘dispose 
of the question of power within networks’ (Freeman, 1998, p. 464-465). 
Freeman’s observations about asymmetrical power relations and 
their potentially harmful consequences were informed by a departure 
from the theoretical assumption that private individual interests tend to 
coincide with social interests, and he cited Keynes approvingly: 
‘the World is not so governed from above that private and social 
interests always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in 
practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Princi-
ples of Economics that enlightened self-interest generally is 
enlightened …” (Freeman & Oldham, 1991, p. 4, emphasis in orig-
inal) citing (Keynes, 1926/2010, p. 288). 
He was clear that when a prevailing set of guiding principles over-
emphasizes individual and corporate interests, this can contribute to 
wealth and income inequalities and other social harms. For example, it 
can threaten civil liberties, endanger industrial and national security, 
and limit the scope for technological choices and alternatives (Freeman, 
1992c). With regard to the governance of powerful corporate actors, he 
suggested that ‘the world is ready for a “Global New Deal” and no longer 
trusts neo-liberal solutions’ (Freeman, 2001b, p. 477). This implied that 
‘market demand is not necessarily the sole, or even the principal, 
determinant of the scale and direction of inventive and innovative ac-
tivity - still less of scientific activity’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 206). Political 
and economic power are treated in Freeman’s work as interdependent 
and this was especially evident when he turned to technological un-
employment and its links to human immiseration ((Freeman, 1994; 
Freeman & Soete, 1994); see also (Frey, 2019)). He recognized that there 
are always alternatives, inspired by contending ideas, values and norms 
that may help to avert harm. As he put it, although it is ‘impossible to 
foresee the future precisely’, it is possible to take action to support 
outcomes ‘which seem desirable and profitable, or prevent those which 
seem dangerous, unwelcome or damaging’ (Freeman, 1995, p. 3). 
In summary, using an analytical approach embracing ambiguity, an 
understanding of emerging principles that shape expectations, and a 
consideration of the politics of innovation alongside its economics, 
Freeman concluded that ‘there would have to be a massive change in 
social justice on a global scale’ if a ‘golden age’ is to emerge from the ICT 
paradigm (Freeman, 2007, p. 50). This conclusion was informed by his 
assessment of the prevailing values and practices associated with pro-
gressive shifts within an ICT paradigm. He noted that where such shifts 
were inconsistent with rights such as privacy protection, the equitable 
treatment of human beings and the implications for social solidarity and 
democracy, action would be necessary. The next section employs the 
three themes discussed here to developments in the ICT paradigm where 
societal benefits and harms and appropriate adjustment responses are 
disputed. 
3. Contentions in contemporary paradigm adjustment processes 
If techno-economic and socio-technical change are continuous 
within the ICT paradigm – not shocks requiring mechanistic market 
adjustments – analytic attention to the themes discussed in the preced-
ing section sensitizes research to benefits and harms, to the need for an 
assessment of likely outcomes and the necessity of policy responses. As 
we have seen, Freeman cautioned against mono-causal explanations of 
ICT paradigm change, its origins and its consequences. By focusing 
analytically on the themes - ambiguity, guiding principles and political 
power – in an examination of components of the ICT system - 5G mobile, 
AIaaS and the operation of the taxation regime – issues come to light that 
would go unnoticed or be underplayed if analysis were to focus mainly 
on market dynamics. In these examples, consistent with Freeman’s 
emphasis on the themes, it is not assumed that private (marketized) 
interests always coincide with broad and often conflicting societal 
interests. 
3.1. 5G innovation adjustments 
5G mobile networks are set to become the communication infra-
structure upon which government and industry depend and wireless 
connectivity is now a vital feature in many consumer and citizen lives. 
5G deployment is estimated to generate some USD 250bn in revenue by 
2025, providing a major boost to the data economy. 5G networks can 
support person-to-machine and machine-to-machine communication 
(the Internet of Things) with multiple applications envisaged across and 
within vertical sectors of the economy (transport, logistics, automotive 
and other manufacturing, media and entertainment) and within the 
public sector. 
5G uses a new network architecture with software-defined virtuali-
zation techniques and proprietary and / or open interface standards. The 
technical standards for 5G have been evolving for some time with the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) publishing its IMT for 
2020 and Beyond vision for 5G in 2015 (ITU, 2015). Standardization 
work has coalesced internationally around a global partnership uniting 
numerous standards development organizations.3 5G is sometimes 
depicted as ‘the realization of a datafied dreamworld’ (Mattern, 2019, p. 
np) with improved data security, resilience and reliability and multiple 
benefits for industry, consumers and citizens (EC, 2016a; ITU, 2015). 
But 5G is also linked to intense concern about harms in relation to data 
protection, privacy and surveillance (Mansell & Plantin, 2020). 
2 Freeman’s work on ICT paradigm guiding principles was influenced by his 
association with SPRU colleagues with training in numerous social sciences 
disciplines beyond economics and by a similarly interdisciplinary network of 
research centres under the ESRC’s Programme on Information and Communi-
cation Technologies, e.g., Dutton (1999, 1996); Mansell (1994); Miles (1988); 
Thomas & Miles (1990) and see Mansell (2002, 2012). 
3 See 3GPP: A Global Initiative, https://www.3gpp.org/about-3gpp/about- 
3gpp. For a review of mobile service history, see Lemstra (2018). 
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Ambivalence about the outcomes of 5G for society depends upon which 
analytical lens – market economics or political and social economics – is 
used to assess the impacts of this change in network design within the 
ICT paradigm. 
In some instances, it is assumed that the commonsense principles 
guiding the 5G innovation pathway are such that this new technical 
system will be designed and implemented to balance public values 
(privacy, data protection and safety) with economic values (stimulating 
global competitiveness of hardware manufacturers and software de-
velopers). While it is recognized that ‘technology is a manifestation of 
the values of those who design it’ in much of the promotional 5G liter-
ature (Watts, 2020, p. 18), it is also often argued by observers in the 
Western democracies that authoritarian states will ‘take advantage of 
preferred relationships with technology firms to build backdoors for 
government access that allow them to surveil the private lives of citizens 
and political opponents at home and abroad’ (Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission, 2020, p. 17). Assessments of benefits and harms of 5G 
deployment are politicized around conflicting values and there are 
substantial uncertainties with very little public domain evidence that 
can be used to verify claims about harms such as threats to privacy or 
national security. 
Freeman’s emphasis on a wider analytical lens beyond the economic, 
also helps to direct attention to social and cultural issues such as resis-
tance to the roll out of 5G due to claims about harms to health. 
Unverified claims, often circulated by celebrities, concerning harms 
linked to electromagnetic field exposure or radiation have circulated 
with previous generations of mobile services, but as 5G trials began 
there have been attacks on 5G equipment installations and on workers 
(some of these targeted 4G technology, not new 5G equipment) 
(Waterson, 2020). The role of social media in amplifying the circulation 
of inaccurate information about potential health threats quickly was 
linked to conspiracy theories spread by QAnon and others, fomenting 
political dissension and becoming entangled with origin claims about 
the Covid-19 pandemic, notwithstanding the World Health Organiza-
tion’s insistence that there is no health effect causally linked to exposure 
to 5G or other wireless systems (WHO, 2020).4 This is a clear case in 
which geopolitical, economic and social interests become entwined with 
decisions concerning investment in a new digital technology architec-
ture and the commonsense principles that should inform corporate and 
government policy action (Mansell & Plantin, 2020; Meese et al., 2020). 
Different views about the outcomes associated with 5G permeate 
conflicts among government and industry advocates of 5G standards. 
Their ideas and values influence whether open standards (e.g., for the 
5G radio access network (RAN)) are preferred over proprietary stan-
dards. Open standards, according to some, are expected to facilitate 
competition among equipment suppliers, boosting efforts to reduce 
reliance of mobile service operators on one of the most prominent 
leaders in the 5G equipment market, the Chinese-owned company, 
Huawei (Fried, 2020).5 Equipment manufacturers, service providers and 
government representatives have been developing consensus-based 5G 
standards for some time. The standards relating to cybersecurity are 
being agreed internationally recognizing that the 5G virtualized service 
architecture presents risks to privacy and security for any country that 
deploys this new technology system (FCC, 2020).6 China was an early 
active contributor to a TDD (time division duplex) standard (reducing 
interference between radio base stations) which is central for 5G, while 
the United States and Europe focused their efforts on FDD (frequency 
division duplex) for earlier generation mobile architectures. As a result, 
Huawei and the Chinese Institute of Telecommunications Research 
established a leadership position in international standardization ac-
tivities, including standards for data protection and privacy in relation 
to the 5G architecture and then in equipment production (ETSI, 2020; 
Forge et al., 2019). In contrast, the United States government’s partic-
ipation in international 5G standards setting regarding security stan-
dards has involved limited observer participation in recent years. In 
relation to 5G standards Rutkowski notes that ‘Washington’s biggest 
cybersecurity challenge is itself. It exists in a bubble of non-stop, self--
similar chat-boxes that have minimal knowledge or apparent interest in 
the history, the actual underlying technologies and ongoing [interna-
tional] activities, or its own culpabilities in the global cybersecurity 
ecosystem’ (Rutkowski, 2020, p. np). 
Despite the expectation of benefits of 5G services, there is uncer-
tainty about how consumer and citizen interests in privacy and data 
protection will be addressed. Much will depend upon the policies and 
practices that become embedded in regulatory regimes. In the United 
States, the aim is to ensure that the government sets ‘the path connecting 
cybersecurity with profitability’ for US-owned companies in the 5G 
market (Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2020, p. 74) and 5G 
deployment is caught up in a United States – China ‘trade war’ initiated 
by the Trump Administration. This is justified by data security concerns, 
but also by a competitiveness challenge and, typically less prominently, 
by China’s human rights record. In the United States the expectation is 
that ‘5G infrastructure will be an attractive target for criminals and 
foreign adversaries due to the large volume of data it transmits and 
processes as well as the support that 5G will provide to critical infra-
structure’ (The White House, 2020, p. 1). In invoking national security 
threats, the use of Chinese technology in 5G networks in the United 
States has been banned and, claiming risks to the Five Eyes security 
alliance, the United States government has sought to influence the 
technology choices of other countries.7 
The United States government has lobbied to bring its Western allies 
into line with its geopolitical strategy, sometimes described as ‘techno- 
nationalism’. For example, its national security adviser, Robert O’Brian, 
said, ‘they [Chinese companies] are just going to steal wholesale state 
secrets, whether they are the UK’s nuclear secrets or secrets from MI6 or 
MI5’ (Sevastopulo, 2019, p. np). In early 2020, the United Kingdom’s 
government sought a compromise with a parliamentary decision to 
approve limited use of Huawei’s equipment in non-core parts of its 5G 
network (antennas and base stations) (Burgess, 2020). This was 
informed by its National Cyber Security Centre’s assessment that secu-
rity risks were manageable (NCSC, 2020). The vote was controversial: 
former Conservative leader, Sir Iain Duncan Smith, characterized the 
use of Huawei equipment as being like using a Nazi firm to develop 
Britain’s radar system in 1939 (Sparrow, 2020). By July 2020 the British 
4 5G uses higher radio spectrum frequencies than earlier wireless mobiles 
services similar to those used in airport body scanners. Standards set by the 
International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection and the IEEE 
International Committee on Electromagnetic Safety regulate maximum expo-
sure. The WHO is studying whether the specific 5G exposure levels are likely to 
exceed safety levels and is expected to report in 2022, but no harms are 
anticipated.  
5 Companies involved in OpenRAN initiatives include NEC and many US 
companies that currently do not hold global leadership positions in the supply 
of 5G hardware or software. Some companies such as Cisco (US), Nokia 
(Finland) and Ericsson (Sweden) are developing open and proprietary ap-
proaches, the latter two having strong market positions in the RAN equipment 
market and mobile technology generally. 
6 International standards in this area include, for example, a standard for 
lawful interception (ETSI, 2019b) and technical specifications for the inter-
ception architecture and functions and delivery of required information to law 
enforcement monitoring facilities (ETSI, 2019a,b).  
7 The US 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
(US, 1994) enables the government to impose requirements on equipment 
manufacturers and network operators to enable lawful communications inter-
ception and to make certain customer data available to law enforcement 
agencies. In 2019 the Federal Communications Commission named Huawei and 
ZTE as companies without protections against unauthorised surveillance and 
indicated that US-owned companies cannot operate in the United States or 
overseas using their equipment (FCC, 2019). 
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government had reversed its position, ordering mobile network opera-
tors to remove all Huawei equipment from their 5G (and earlier gen-
eration) networks. European-owned companies (Nokia and Ericsson) 
have since bid successfully to provide the necessary 5G equipment 
(BBC, 2020). Other countries including Australia have decided to ban or 
much reduce their reliance on equipment supplied by Chinese-owned 
companies, while others, such as Japan, resisted pressure. China 
meanwhile has published a security framework calling on countries to 
‘stand against ICT activities that impair or steal important data of other 
States’ critical infrastructure, or use the data to conduct activities that 
undermine other States’ national security and public interests’ (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 2020, p. np). Huawei and government officials 
maintain that Chinese technology is no riskier than that supplied by 
non-Chinese owned companies. 
It is also claimed that the Chinese state unfairly subsidizes Huawei 
and other Chinese-owned companies’ development of 5G technology 
and that this presents a threat to the bidding prospects of companies 
based in other countries. Yet the United States is considering financial 
support for American-owned 5G equipment manufacturers and mobile 
service operators (The Economist, 2020) and the United Kingdom gov-
ernment is providing funds to support companies undertaking 5G use 
case trials and early network roll outs. Domestically, there is evidence 
that China is ramping up its deployment of surveillance technologies, e. 
g., facial recognition and data collection about its citizens as part of its 
datafication strategy (Batke, 2020), but this does not constitute evidence 
that Chinese companies will be forced by the Chinese government to 
reveal data generated in their external markets (FCC, 2019). In this 
conflicted geopolitical context, to protect against 5G-related cyberse-
curity risks the United States is seeking to develop its own alternative 
standards (Rutkowski, 2020). As Mueller says, however, ‘one is tempted 
to ask what would happen if the Microsoft or Android operating systems 
were exposed to the same level of scrutiny as Huawei’ for security 
purposes (Mueller, 2019, p. np). 
In the case of 5G innovation we see the clear interdependence of 
political and economic power. The expectations underpinning claims 
and counterclaims about national security threats, 5G network vulner-
abilities and state subsidies are difficult to resolve empirically because 
much information is subject to national security protections. There are 
consequences for society, nonetheless. Whatever the guiding principles 
that will prevail and influence 5G standards and practices, by focusing 
debate on China and its companies, the United States (and other coun-
tries) suggest that Western 5G implementations are safe from the point 
of view of national security and consumer and citizen privacy concerns. 
The exercise of political and economic power (through trade sanctions 
and bans on equipment), achieves a naturalization of the 5G architecture 
as an inevitable (positive) next step in technological innovation. Yet this 
architecture has the potential for a step shift in the capacity for com-
mercial datafication. It presents new risks to citizen privacy and to 
regulatory regimes for data protection insofar as the deployment of 5G 
by any country will confront policy makers with a very substantial 
expansion in the availability of both personal and non-personal data for 
monetization controlled by larger and smaller companies. This outcome 
receives far less attention when the focus in 5G research is predomi-
nantly on market expansion prospects. 
3.2. Cloud innovation adjustments 
Digital services in the cloud are an increasingly debated facet of 
contemporary change in the ICT paradigm. Data generated online are 
stored and processed in cloud infrastructures offering infrastructure, 
platform and software ‘as-a-service’.8 The cloud industry is dominated 
by a small number of American-owned companies, the largest by 
revenue being Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google 
Cloud. Others, including Chinese-owned companies such as Alibaba and 
Tencent Cloud command a sizeable market share.9 In the European 
Union there are more than 1,000 European-headquartered cloud service 
companies,10 with European-owned providers taking a small share of 
the market. The value of the data economy in the European Union 27 
countries is expected to reach €829bn by 2025 or 5.8 percent of GDP and 
to provide many opportunities for skilled employment (EC, 2020b; 
Alemanno, 2020). 
An addition to these services is AIaaS (AI as a Service) which enables 
the monetizing of data using AI-driven algorithms.11 This service is 
marketed as a cost-reducing on-demand service option that can scale to 
meet customer requirements and as providing benefits in the form of 
personalized health care, improved policy decision making and oppor-
tunities to boost the data economy (EC, 2017). These services also are 
accompanied by acknowledged data security risks, harms associated 
with biased discriminatory outcomes in decision making, and threats to 
personal data and privacy protection (EC, 2020c). In Europe, the policy 
goal is to promote a common European data space governed to secure 
both European public values and to promote a ‘data-agile’ economy 
(EC, 2020b). And in this region, the prominent guiding principle or 
expectation is that public values such as the rights to individual privacy 
and to non-discriminatory treatment of consumers and citizens as a 
result of algorithm-based decisions will be balanced with corporate and 
state interests in economic value. 
The European response to the foreign-owned platform supply of 
AIaaS confirms that there is scope to pursue alternative pathways within 
the ICT paradigm; that is, departures from the approaches taken by the 
dominant cloud service providers. The guiding principles in Europe for 
the provision of AIaaS stress the retention of human agency and over-
sight of AI/algorithm-based decision making, safety, privacy assurances 
and non-discrimination. Ethical principles and legislation requiring 
transparency, accountability and privacy protection are being devel-
oped to pursue a European alternative (EC, 2020c).12 As the French 
Minister for the Economy put it, ‘we are not China, we are not the United 
States — we are European countries with our own values and our own 
European interests that we want to defend’ (Delcker & Heikkila, 2020, p. 
np). A European Data Strategy is being put in place to ensure that Europe 
is ‘a leading role model for a society empowered by data to make better 
decisions – in business and the public sector’ (EC, 2020b, p. 1). 
Privacy legislation sets the regulatory regime for AIaaS and other 
services provided by digital platform companies in Europe. Since the 
dominant cloud providers are headquartered outside the European 
Union, they host data beyond European boundaries. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EC, 2016b) sets rules for commercial 
transfers of personal data outside the European Union and there are 
efforts to establish ‘data sovereignty’ to ensure that European public 
values are secured. Questions may be raised about how effective this 
legislation is in protecting citizens’ personal data, but regarding data 
transfer outside the European Union, a European Court of Justice deci-
sion has confirmed that Europe’s privacy legislation holds when data are 
transferred to another country, even for defense or state security reasons 
8 This is changing with the 5G software distributed network which enables 
data to be stored on devices at the edges of networks. 
9 See Statista (2020) which includes platform-as-a-service and 
infrastructure-as-a-service and hosted private cloud services, and see 
software-as-a-service Holst (2020).  
10 See SAP (2020), 1,187 companies.  
11 Both supervised AI for classification and statistical analysis of large data sets 
and unsupervised AI relying on deep learning to generate predictive patterns. 
12 The European Union sees itself as being well-positioned for global leader-
ship in the AI field having influenced the OECD’s (2019a) ethical principles and 
the G20’s endorsement of these principles. 
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(EU, 2020b).13 This legal interpretation has brought Europe into conflict 
with the data protections available to citizens in the United States. 
Under the US Cloud Act (US, 2018), cloud provider companies can enter 
agreements with other countries for data access, but they are required to 
release data to United States authorities for criminal prosecution 
without informing data subjects. There is disagreement concerning what 
Europe’s legal interpretation will mean in practice, but it is indicative of 
a move towards ‘data sovereignty’. The cloud companies are likely to 
have stronger incentives to store personal data within the European 
Union especially if European authorities are ‘particularly vigilant to 
protect and assert the rights, obligations and interests of Europeans and 
companies’ (EC, 2020b: 23). These and other guiding principles are 
being incorporated within a new legislative package – the Digital Ser-
vices Act and the Digital Markets Act (EC, 2020a). 
The perception that the European data market does not favor the 
growth of European-owned cloud companies due to the dominance of 
foreign-owned platforms, combined with ambitions for data sover-
eignty, have yielded an alternative cloud architecture, GAIA-X. Its 
development was led initially by the German and French governments to 
counter foreign dominance in the AIaaS market (GAIA-X, 2020). It aims 
to create a competitive set of standards and procedures that will 
incentivize European companies to store their data under conditions 
where the user ‘can be sure that European law is applied, and the pro-
viders know about the security and the GDPR readiness of their offerings 
and the payment conditions’ (Ksoll, nd, p. np). Offering a directory of 
service providers, identity management standards and quality moni-
toring guidance, it will establish an open data infrastructure with 
common minimum standards for security- and privacy-by-design. 
GAIA-X operates as a layer above the platforms of both dominant 
foreign and European companies, with the former joining if they commit 
to GAIA-X’s values and standards (Amaro, 2020; Bedingfield, 2020; 
Delcker & Heikkila, 2020).14 
Adjustment to the ICT paradigm in this instance involves an ex ante 
data protection regime and a concerted effort to mitigate the risk of 
harms to consumers and citizens in relation to data privacy. Yet it does 
little to alter the core AIaaS guiding principle of the dominant cloud 
providers’ business model. This requires end-user consumers to opt out 
of the data economy or to use privacy protection technologies requiring 
relatively high levels of data literacy if they want to maximize their 
individual data protection. For some analysts, this approach sustains the 
prevailing commonsense principles that ‘perpetuate neoliberal regimes 
of responsibilization’ (Flyverbom et al., 2017; Martin & Nissenbaum, 
2020, p. 193), shifting responsibility disproportionately to individuals to 
secure their rights. For instance, auto-deletion of users’ location data 
limits Google’s accumulation of users’ online data, but users must 
change their settings manually to opt out. This allows Google to claim 
that it performs privacy protection assurance that meets the required 
standards (Hern, 2019), even if data are not held within the European 
Union’s cloud infrastructure. 
The European response to dominant American and Chinese-owned 
cloud providers involves guiding principles for the data economy that 
are both economically motivated to achieve growth and politically or 
socially motivated to support European public values. The success of 
GAIA-X and other European policies (including antitrust measures) in 
addressing the asymmetrical power between foreign-owned and do-
mestic cloud platforms in a way that enables competing values to be 
balanced is speculative at the time of writing. The outcome will depend 
on policy makers’ enforcement capacity. These guiding principles may 
be actualized only as performative discourse that is not carried through 
in the practices of the companies (Helm & Seubert, 2020, p. 193). 
Harmful behaviors may go undetected due to the complexity of the 
digital system and the challenges of producing evidence to hold the 
companies to account. The commercial cloud providers are unlikely to 
forego opportunities to reap financial rewards from the monetization of 
personal and non-personal data if they can innovate to create novel ways 
of collecting and processing data that circumvent the policies that are 
put in place. 
3.3. Taxation adjustments 
Paradigm change is accompanied by changes in areas of the societal 
system less directly connected with choices about technical standards 
and regulatory regimes for digital services. Consistent with the need for 
institutional adjustments, international taxation rules have been under 
discussion as the ICT paradigm has enabled the global supply of services. 
The centrality of commercial datafication strategies and the dominance 
of very large foreign-owned digital platform companies are presenting 
challenges to the sustainability of the tax base.15 By market capitaliza-
tion and by value of digital transactions, the dominant companies 
generate very substantial revenues and, in most cases, group profits 
(CEPS, 2019). It is claimed that digital platforms pay substantially less 
than they should in the countries in which they operate (Freuler, 2020) 
and the international taxation regime is depicted as unfairly enabling tax 
avoidance and facilitating a path towards inequality. 
In response to arguments favoring adjustment to this regime to better 
sustain government support for public services, investment in infra-
structure and to avert social disorder resulting from rising socio- 
economic inequalities in the mid 1990s, a ‘bit tax’ was proposed to 
collect revenues from the transmission of information by electronic 
means (HLEG, 1997; Soete & Kamp, 1996). Criticized at the time for the 
potential impact of such a tax on the rate of innovation in digital tech-
nology and services, in 1998 the World Trade Organization imposed a 
moratorium on taxing services provided using the internet. The expected 
benefits of digitally-driven innovation for economic growth received a 
privileged position as compared to arguments about the need to sustain 
public welfare. With human populations facing health, unemployment 
and environmental crises, the urgency of a response to the rise of ‘big 
tech’ platforms and the need to ensure that countries have a sustainable 
tax base is increasing. There is movement as well towards taxes specif-
ically targeting the large digital platform companies with a view to 
sustaining public interest journalism and media as they have become 
dependent on platform services to distribute their content. Ambivalence 
about which values should receive priority has created institutional ri-
gidity and it has not so far been politically feasible to agree guiding 
principles for international taxation in the digital era. 
In the pre-internet era, the existing international taxation principles 
were regarded as common sense.16 Taxes are levied against revenues (e. 
g. value added tax) or profits (e.g. corporate profit taxes) in the country 
where a company is legally established. However, digital services 
offered online do not necessarily require a physical presence and the 
billing for these services or the international allocation of costs of 
13 The Court found that, ‘unless there is a valid Commission adequacy deci-
sion, … competent supervisory authorities are required to suspend or prohibit a 
transfer of personal data to a third country where they take the view, in the 
light of all the circumstances of that transfer, that the standard data protection 
clauses are not or cannot be complied with in that country’ (EU, 2020a: np, 
2020b).  
14 GAIA-X was established in mid-2020 as a not-for-profit company with an 
initial annual budget of €1.5m. 
15 The purpose of this section is not to detail the complex stipulations under 
existing international, national or within country, tax law. Despite a United 
States government commitment to a permanent moratorium on taxes on 
internet access and on internet-only services under the US Trade Facilitation 
and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (incorporating the Internet Tax Freedom 
Act, 1998, (US, 1998, 2016), more than half the American states levy some form 
of tax on digital products (mostly downloads) at a rate of 1 to 7 percent.  
16 One key area nevertheless of ambiguity was international transfer pricing 
which enabled companies to reap profits in the jurisdiction of their choice. 
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producing them may be arranged to reduce these taxes. The OECD and 
G20 countries have been seeking to change the international tax rules to 
enable countries to tax revenues or profits where value creation occurs 
using a new concept, ‘significant economic presence’. For example, a 
platform with a local warehouse and employees supporting the sale of 
goods online could provide a basis for taxation if the tax regime were to 
be changed (OECD, 2015, 2019b, 2019c). As the G7 says, these countries 
are working ‘to enable our economies and communities to adjust to the 
pace of change today, so that the global economy works for everyone’ 
(emphasis added) (G7, 2017, p. 2). The G7 and OECD proposals met 
resistance during the Trump Administration. At this writing in early 
2021 there is renewed momentum towards a shift in the priorities and 
values underpinning the international tax rules to create a fairer regime. 
It is also argued, however, that a change in taxation is unnecessary 
because economic value is created by platform companies, not by their 
users and it is unfair to target large (foreign) companies (Kennedy, 
2019). Thus, it is not clear whether a global agreement will be achieved. 
Regionally and nationally, nevertheless, there have been signs of 
change. The European Commission has recognized that: 
‘digital business have different characteristics than traditional ones 
in terms of how value is created, due to their ability to conduct ac-
tivities remotely, the contribution of end-users in their value crea-
tion, the importance of intangible assets, as well as a tendency 
towards winner-takes-most market structures rooted in the strong 
presence of network effects and the value of big data’ (EC, 2018, p. 
2). 
The Commission proposed that tax be collected where a human user 
of large digital platforms is involved (not machine-to-machine 
communication) and when data collection is for monetization pur-
poses. In the absence of agreement on the Commission’s proposals, 
member states have been unilaterally introducing digital taxes, gener-
ally on revenues, not profits. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom are among those introducing national digital taxes, 
with France observing that ‘economic efficiency is at stake, as well as tax 
fairness and sovereignty’ (Le Maire et al., 2017, p. np). Even if a tax (2 
percent on revenues in the United Kingdom) is passed on by charging an 
additional fee to the digital platforms’ advertising clients or to those 
who sell their products using a platform, the intention is to enhance the 
fairness of taxation, albeit currently raising relatively small amounts of 
revenue for the tax base.17 The United States government has responded 
to these moves by insisting that the imposition of national digital taxes is 
a nontariff trade barrier and that the digital platform companies might 
reduce or withdraw their services or pass the costs onto users. The 
United States has introduced retaliatory measures in the form of trade 
sanctions against countries implementing a digital services tax based on 
the results of US Trade Representative investigations under section 301 
of the US Trade Act (1974) (Fleming et al., 2020; US, 1974; VAT Update, 
2020). Confronted with the Covid-19 pandemic, the G20 countries 
postponed their efforts to reach agreement on new international tax 
principles and the United States has not implemented its trade sanctions 
during the pandemic crisis but may do so if ongoing negotiations fail. 
Before the pandemic, there also were concerns about whether de-
velopments within the ICT paradigm are leading to automation-induced 
unemployment without the creation of compensating jobs for workers 
and about the precarious working conditions in the face of flexible 
contracting in the ‘gig’ economy. A change in taxation principles cannot 
be expected to address this and other harms associated with the ICT 
paradigm directly. It might, however, provide a potentially stronger 
buffer for those disadvantaged by the social costs of adjustment to 
changes in the paradigm as is implied by Sennett’s (2019, p. np) 
observation that in today’s technology-enabled world, ‘a specter of 
uselessness hangs over people – a sense of bareness’. Freeman took the 
view that we should not look to ICTs (even if universally available) to 
stabilize economies and societies when they are facing destabilizing 
technological change (Freeman, 2001a). A consideration of the need for 
politically-inspired interventions to address the social costs of adjust-
ments to new digital technologies and assure that public values are 
upheld was certainly a prominent feature in in his work. 
4. Conclusion 
Digital technology innovation – a major part of the 4th Industrial 
Revolution – involving advances in AI and data analytics and ever 
‘smarter’ networks, is often depicted as the pathway for averting or 
mitigating economic and social crises, albeit with policy or regulatory 
adjustments (Schwab, 2017; United Nations, 2019). In welcoming 
evidenced-based debate on the contemporary path of innovation, 
Freeman also would likely have cautioned against a narrow focus on 
technology and the digital market. While many scholars working in the 
critical traditions of the social sciences (e.g. science and technologies 
studies, critical approaches in communication studies and other disci-
plines) have long heeded this advice, there is still within the neoclassical 
economics and the economics of technological innovation fields, a 
prominent overemphasis on research focusing primarily on market dy-
namics – the monetization of data – with the expectation that 
technology-induced change will lead to an optimization of market out-
comes with benefits for all. While Freeman regarded capitalism and its 
institutions as the ‘most effective in human history in stimulating a flow 
of technical and organizational innovations and diffusing them through 
the production system’ (Freeman, 1992c, p. 216), he also argued that 
there may be circumstances in which certain technical innovations 
should not be deployed. Further, that when they are deployed, there 
must be an effort to ‘humanize’ technology as distinct from focusing 
principally on profit and economic growth (Freeman, 1994, p. 11). 
The three themes – ambiguity, guiding principles and politics – are 
among many that might have been selected from Freeman’s work on 
paradigmatic techno-economic change to inform the discussion in the 
preceding section. These themes are helpful, however, because they 
encourage a researcher to distinguish between taken-for-granted prin-
ciples and practices and potential alternatives that could yield outcomes 
that are fairer and more equitable. Alternative standards that better 
secure privacy in 5G networks, privacy enhancing legislation for the 
deployment of AIaaS, and revised choices about tax rules and the dis-
tribution of public revenues are examples of such potential alternatives. 
Freeman ventured considerably beyond the limiting assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory. For him, ambiguous outcomes – benefits 
and harms – of the innovation process were empirical problems for 
investigation. His recognition of the need for political interventions in 
the market is evident in his observations about the need for government 
funding of redistribution policies and the ‘need for a strong ethos of 
solidarity’ (Freeman & Soete, 2005, p. 350). He was concerned about 
concentrations of political and economic power (Freeman, 1992c), 
commenting that their consequences in the form of ‘extreme disparities 
of wealth and income not only jeopardize civil liberty and inhibit 
technological choice, they also endanger industrial and national security 
and are offensive to common decency’ (Freeman, 1992c, p. 226). 
There is no indication that Freeman expected the dominance of large 
firms to be eroded by advances in digital technology (Freeman, 2007). 
For instance, he signaled that upholding the right to freedom of speech 
would be crucial to limit abuses of power by dominant companies (and 
states), commenting that when this right is not upheld ‘talk of freedom of 
choice is often empty air’ (Freeman, 1992c, p. 223). Freeman’s work 
was prescient. In a period of dominant digital platforms and advancing 
commercial datafication, which until quite recently was widely treated 
as an exemplary pattern of techno-economic change - broadly consistent 
with beneficial outcomes for society, his work serves as an important 
17 The amounts of tax revenue are tiny compared to billions in state expen-
diture associated with national Covid-19 responses. 
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guide for investigations of the harmful consequences of these de-
velopments. These include the massive scaling up of platforms leading to 
entrenched corporate control structures, hyperactive financial capital 
delinked from the ‘real’ economy and the invisible nudging of human 
behavior (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2020; Zuboff, 2019). 
Steps are being taken in countries in the West, the East and the global 
South to regulate dominant digital platforms and their practices. These 
include measures to achieve data privacy protection, to strengthen 
competition policy and introduce accountability for the content hosted 
by these companies, plus changes in taxation rules. These are likely to 
moderate some features of digital companies’ business strategies that 
are inconsistent with public values but struggles to uphold these values 
by adopting commonsense principles that enable, rather than disable, 
individual and collective wellbeing are ongoing. Freeman’s emphasis on 
reimagining the future and on resisting technological innovation path-
ways that perpetuate power asymmetries and produce social and eco-
nomic inequalities is salutary. It continues to inspire scholarly research 
on techno-economic and socio-technical change which insists that 
monetizing digital information for commercial gain is not the only way 
to design and operate digital technologies in support of individuals and 
their societies. 
Like many researchers who undertake critical scholarship on the 
complex determinants of our digitized future (Couldry & Mejias, 2019; 
van D Dijck et al., 2018; Mansell, 2021 In Press; Zuboff, 2019), Freeman, 
no doubt would have championed research aimed at evidencing the 
multiple causes and consequences of contemporary digital technology 
designs and data ownership and control arrangements. His insistence on 
a ‘economics of hope’ might have oriented him, not only to explaining 
and resisting harmful and exploitative outcomes, but to actively 
engaging with policy making to help shape expectations and to mobilize 
the features of changes in the techno-economic ICT paradigm ‘for good’. 
In line with Freeman’s insights, proposals for alternative innovation 
choices are essential, with pathways evaluated not solely by the narrow 
metrics of economic analysis, but by using a broader analytical framing 
encompassing the political, the social and the cultural. 
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